Recent Russian reports provide more color on Russian official sector’s move out of the the USD in Q2 of last year. The big focus of the CBR reserves composition report (see thread here) was the move into CNY assets, making Russia is now one of the largest holders of offshore CNY reserve assets. Despite the speeding up of the reserves diversification (most of which continues to be into EUR). the USD continues to dominate in cross-border trade and financial transactions. The move, already visible in the US data last summer, raised questions about the impact on broader USD assets at a time of fiscal and monetary pressure on USTs. The risks of Russia purchases look overstated, given the relatively small size of its holdings, continued purchases by other countries (including other oil producers) and ability of the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity if needed. Bigger long-term concerns around USTs should focus around the fiscal position, which is going to increase the amount of issuance in coming years – likely increasing the US cost of financings. Local and foreign investors are likely to bear this cost unless there are any signs the U.S. willingness to pay is shifting.
Russia’s move to sell USD was political, following the April 2018 sanctions on Russia and the local press estimated realized losses of $1.5b – admittedly small compared to Russia’s stock of assets and not necessarily something of concern to the government. The move sped up the shift away from the USD in Russia’s FX holdings. The increase brings CNY holdings up to $62 billion of Russia’s $430b+ portfolio, meaning Russia now accounts for about 1/3 of the $192 billion in global reported CNY reserve holdings (IMF COFER) and just about all of the $40 billion increase in global reserve holdings of CNY in Q2. This is but one of the increasing links between Russia and China, which I’ve previously cited as a source of resilience for Russia. Of course, CNY-denominated bonds are not very liquid, and bilateral trade in CNY is still quite low between the countries suggesting limited benefit for reserve assets, particularly given the likely interest rate moves. What does this mean for broader USD holdings? Figure 1: Holdings of Long-Term US Treasurys (USD million) TIC Compared to turnover of the USTs even the 100b is not something that big… but would be more important if other countries followed suit. That doesn’t seem to be happening. Chinese holdings are pretty stable with ups and downs due to currency management and GCC countries (KSA but also Kuwait and Qatar) seem to have been parking funds in USTs at the end of last year- at least for now. The increase in Saudi holdings of USTs (net $40 billion) in Q3 partly offsets the sharp decline in Russian holdings, likely reflecting the increase in energy revenues. The increase in KSA holdings far outpaces its reserves growth suggesting that the Saudis may have been parking the funds in UST after raising the funds in some of the bond issuance. The increase in cash flow from Saudi Arabia energy sales inQ2 and Q3 last year (and maybe the bond issuance) seems to have gone into USTs and may have helped them finance the outflows that resulted when locals and foreigners continued to flee after the Kashoggi murder. Given the fiscal dynamics there and fall in oil prices this increase was likely temporary. Still, there is reason to expect that any shortage of buyers and associated interest in rates, would likely bring in more pensions, insurers and others looking to match their asset and liability portfolios. Of foreign holders, China remains key – and the PBoC seems unlikely to cut holdings for political reasons. As I’ve written in the past, Chinese Treasury holdings reflect domestic economic choices rather than geo-political ones suggesting that local capital outflows and FX management will drive its foreign portfolio. Attempts to reduce treasury holdings would put appreciation pressure on the renminbi, undermine global and Chinese financial stability and likely reduce the value of their existing holdings. That’s not to say that de-dollarization is not something to watch, but it looks to be a slow moving machine. Other critical policies to watch remain efforts by the European authorities to skirt U.S. sanctions, which are so far having only limited rhetorical impact. More important is the fiscal outlook of the U.S. which will likely put pressure on a range of assets.
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AuthorRachel's musings on macroeconomic issues, policy and more. Archives
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